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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Rosemary Montgomery appeals from the entry of 
summary judgment against her in her suit brought 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983 which arises out of the events 
surrounding her arrest on September 30, 1992. 
Montgomery alleges that Officer Jeffrey De Simone did not 
have probable cause to stop and arrest her for speeding 
and drunk driving. She accordingly brought several section 
1983 claims against Officer De Simone, including a claim 
based on malicious prosecution. 
 
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether 
Montgomery's convictions, which were overturned upon de 
novo review, conclusively establish probable cause and 
necessarily negate any possibility that Montgomery could 
establish her section 1983 malicious prosecution claim. We 
hold that they do not. Accordingly, because we find that 
Montgomery has raised a genuine issue of material fact as 
to probable cause, we will reverse the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Officer De Simone on 
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Montgomery's section 1983 malicious prosection claim and 
will remand this case for further proceedings. 
 
In addition, we find that, as a matter of law, the two year 
limitations period for Montgomery's section 1983 false 
arrest and false imprisonment claims began to run on the 
night of Montgomery's arrest and that her claims against 
the municipal defendants fail because Montgomery's 
allegations are insufficient to establish municipal liability. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's order 
dismissing those claims. 
 
I. 
 
On September 30, 1992, Officer Jeffrey De Simone 
stopped Rosemary Montgomery, arrested her and charged 
her with speeding, driving while intoxicated, and refusing to 
take a breathalyzer test. At Montgomery's municipal 
hearing, Officer De Simone testified that he stopped 
Montgomery because she was traveling at approximately 55 
m.p.h. in a 40 m.p.h. zone. De Simone testified that he 
estimated Montgomery's speed prior to the stop based on 
his own observation and a radar reading. According to De 
Simone, when he stopped Montgomery he detected a strong 
odor of alcohol on her breath. De Simone testified that 
Montgomery had difficulty locating her license in her wallet, 
could not open the glove box and became frustrated when 
De Simone opened the glove box with ease. According to De 
Simone, Montgomery could not recite the alphabet when 
asked to do so and failed two field sobriety tests. De 
Simone stated that Montgomery's eyes were "watery," her 
speech was "slightly slurred," and that "she was swaying 
and staggering" when standing and walking. 
 
De Simone further testified that during the stop, a 
second car pulled up to ask directions. De Simone then 
instructed Montgomery to drive her car across the road to 
a vacant parking lot so that he might attend to the second 
car. He subsequently drove to where she was parked and 
took her to the police station. At the police station De 
Simone advised Montgomery for the first time that she was 
under arrest, read her her Miranda rights, and asked her to 
take a breathalyzer test. Montgomery refused the test. 
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Montgomery's testimony at her municipal trial painted a 
dramatically different picture of the events surrounding her 
arrest. According to Montgomery, she had just returned 
from a transcontinental flight and had met a friend for 
dinner. She testified, and her friend corroborated, that she 
did not have any alcoholic beverages with dinner. She 
further testified, and her friend corroborated, that she 
ordered one Irish coffee after dinner and that the bartender 
had refilled her same cup with regular coffee after she 
finished most of the Irish coffee. Montgomery's friend 
further testified that Montgomery did not appear to be 
intoxicated and that they parted company at approximately 
11:20 p.m. 
 
Montgomery testified that after leaving her friend's house, 
she had been stopped at a red light which was located less 
than one tenth of a mile from the intersection where 
De Simone testified she was traveling at 55 m.p.h. In her 
deposition in this case, Montgomery further testified that 
she could not have been exceeding the speed limit in that 
short distance in her Hyundai and that she knows she was 
not speeding. She also testified that De Simone lied at her 
municipal trial. 
 
At her municipal trial, Montgomery testified that she did 
have trouble finding her license for De Simone because it 
was mixed in with receipts from her overseas trip. She also 
testified that she had trouble opening the glove 
compartment because it always sticks but that she 
eventually opened it herself without the help of De Simone. 
According to Montgomery, she recited the alphabet correctly 
when asked but De Simone never asked her to leave her 
vehicle for sobriety tests. 
 
Montgomery testified that at one point during the stop De 
Simone stated "I shouldn't be doing this but would you pull 
across to behind Wall Street and wait for me?" Montgomery 
testified that she was unaware of anyone stopping and 
asking for directions. After she waited in the parking lot for 
about five to ten minutes, De Simone pulled up behind her 
with no overhead lights on. De Simone got out of the car 
and his demeanor changed. De Simone asked Montgomery 
if she liked policemen and if she dated them. Montgomery 
testified that she was very uncomfortable and tried to 
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change the subject and that De Simone then offered her a 
ride home. She told De Simone that he would have to leave 
his jurisdiction to give her a ride and he then offered to 
take her to the station to make a phone call. Montgomery 
testified that De Simone's demeanor again changed and he 
became sullen. When they arrived at the station, De Simone 
advised Montgomery for the first time that she was under 
arrest and read her her rights. Another of Montgomery's 
friends picked her up at the police station around 2:00 a.m. 
and testified that Montgomery did not appear drunk and 
that Montgomery told her that she had only had two Irish 
coffees that night. 
 
The municipal court judge found that there was probable 
cause for the stop and the arrest for drunk driving based 
entirely upon De Simone's testimony. In addition, after 
hearing all the testimony offered, the municipal judge found 
Montgomery guilty of speeding, drunk driving, and refusing 
to take a breathalyzer test. Montgomery appealed her 
convictions. 
 
On February 4, 1994, a trial de novo was held in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey. The court reversed 
Montgomery's convictions entering not guilty verdicts on all 
charges. The Superior Court judge expressed doubt as to 
whether Montgomery was speeding, given her testimony 
that she had been stopped at a light just a short distance 
from where De Simone claimed she was exceeding the 
speed limit. In addition, the judge expressed doubt as to 
whether De Simone actually thought Montgomery was 
drunk given that De Simone ordered her to drive her car 
across four lanes of traffic to a vacant parking lot after she 
allegedly failed several sobriety tests. 
 
On February 1, 1995, Montgomery filed a complaint in 
the District Court of New Jersey alleging a section 1983 
claim for malicious prosecution, section 1983 false arrest 
and false imprisonment claims arising out of her arrest and 
temporary detention on September 30, 1992, section 1983 
claims against the township and police department 
(collectively the "municipal defendants") based on De 
Simone's actions, and several state law claims relating to 
her arrest. On March 11, 1997, the district courtfiled an 
order holding that (1) Montgomery's section 1983 claim for 
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malicious prosecution failed as a matter of law because the 
municipal judge had reasonably determined that probable 
cause existed for the arrest; (2) the two year statute of 
limitations for Montgomery's section 1983 false arrest and 
false imprisonment claims began to run on the date of her 
arrest and those claims were therefore time barred; and (3) 
Montgomery's section 1983 claims against the municipal 
defendants should be dismissed because Montgomery failed 
to produce evidence that would raise a genuine issue of 
material fact on those claims.1 Montgomery timely filed this 
appeal.2 
 
II. 
 
In order to prevail on her section 1983 malicious 
prosecution claim, Montgomery must establish, among 
other things, an absence of probable cause for the initiation 
of the proceedings against her. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 
331, 349 (3d Cir. 1989)(citing Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 
69-70 (3d Cir. 1988)). The district court granted summary 
judgment on Montgomery's section 1983 malicious 
prosecution claim based upon the premise that the 
municipal judge's finding of probable cause for her arrest 
negated any possibility that Montgomery could establish an 
absence of probable cause for purposes of her section 1983 
malicious prosecution claim. 
 
We have held that the question of probable cause in a 
section 1983 damage suit is one for the jury. Patzig v. 
O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 1978). Summary 
judgment on Montgomery's malicious prosecution claim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court also held that Montgomery's state law claims against 
De Simone were time barred and that her state law claims against the 
municipal defendants were barred by governmental immunity. 
Montgomery has not appealed these rulings. 
 
2. The district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Montgomery's 
section 1983 action and supplemental claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331, 1343(a)(3), 1367(a)(1994). We have appellate jurisdiction over 
the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291(1994). We exercise de novo 
review over the district court's order granting summary judgment. 
Boneberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 23 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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therefore is only appropriate if taking all of Montgomery's 
allegations as true and resolving all inferences in her favor, 
a reasonable jury could not find a lack of probable cause 
for Montgomery's stop and arrest. Deary v. Three Un-named 
Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 1984). 
Accordingly, we must examine the evidence presented by 
Montgomery on probable cause and, applying any 
appropriate presumptions, determine whether Montgomery 
has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Officer De Simone had probable cause for her stop and 
arrest. 
 
A. 
 
At common law, a conviction presumptively establishes 
the existence of probable cause absent a showing that the 
conviction was achieved through perjury, fraud or 
corruption. See generally Lind v. Schmid, 337 A.2d 365, 
370 (N.J. 1975)(stating that a conviction by a magistrate, 
even if subsequently overturned, may raise a rebuttable 
presumption of probable cause for purposes of a malicious 
prosection claim). Derived from the Restatement of Torts,3 
the rule is based on the reasoning that if a factfinder 
determined that the accused was guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the person who initiated the proceedings 
must have had reasonable grounds for so doing. See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 667(1) cmt. b. (1977). The 
rule was developed to establish probable cause in a 
malicious prosecution action against a private citizen, 
however, not probable cause for arrest by a police officer. 
Bergstralh v. Lowe, 504 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1974). 
Moreover, not all state courts adhere to this rule. See 
generally C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Conclusiveness, as 
evidence of probable cause in malicious prosecution action, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Restatement of Torts provides, in relevant part, that: 
 
       The conviction of the accused by a magistrate or trial court, 
       although reversed by an appellate tribunal, conclusively 
establishes 
       the existence of probable cause, unless the conviction was obtained 
       by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 667(1)(1977). 
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of conviction as affected by the fact that it was reversed or 
set aside, 86 A.L.R. 2d 1090 (1962) (discussing position 
taken by various state courts). 
 
The Supreme Court has not yet made clear whether 
common law rules, such as this Restatement rule, apply to 
section 1983 actions. In determining whether a certain 
common law concept governs a section 1983 action, the 
Court has been guided by the extent to which the common 
law rule is rooted in history and reason and whether the 
policies it serves are compatible with the purposes of 
section 1983. See Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 
445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980); City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, 
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259 (1981). As explained by the Court: 
 
       [B]ecause the [Civil Rights Act] was designed to expose 
       state and local officials to a new form of liability, it 
       would defeat the promise of the statute to recognize 
       any preexisting [common law concept] without 
       determining both the policies that it serves and its 
       compatibility with the purposes of S 1983. 
 
City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 259. Although in City of 
Newport the Court expressed its approval of this analysis in 
relation to common law immunity, we find this approach 
equally appropriate in determining whether a general 
common law rule should be applied to section 1983 
actions. 
 
In Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1986), our 
sister court of appeals for the Second Circuit followed City 
of Newport and held that a rule similar to the Restatement 
rule applied to section 1983 actions. Where the plaintiff 
had been convicted and the conviction had not been 
overturned, the common law principle that a conviction 
gives the police officer a complete defense barred the 
plaintiff 's section 1983 false arrest claim. Id. at 387-89. 
The court reasoned that the availability of this defense does 
not undermine the goals of section 1983 because the 
exclusionary rule is sufficient to deter law enforcement 
officers from making an arrest without probable cause. Id. 
at 388. The court concluded that application of the 
common law rule to section 1983 actions struck "the proper 
accommodation between the individual's interest in 
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preventing unwarranted intrusions into his liberty and 
society's interest in encouraging the apprehension of 
criminals . . . ." Id. 
 
In Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989), we 
criticized the policy considerations underlying Cameron. We 
expressed doubt as to whether the rule announced in 
Cameron "reflect[s] the `proper accommodation between the 
individual's interest in preventing unwarranted intrusion 
into his liberty and society's interest in encouraging the 
apprehension of criminals' " in light of the availability of 
qualified immunity as a defense in section 1983 actions. 
Rose, 871 F.2d at 351. 
 
We hold today that the Restatement's rule that an 
overturned municipal conviction presumptively establish 
probable cause contravenes the policies underlying the Civil 
Rights Act and therefore does not apply to a section 1983 
malicious prosection action. The central aim of the Civil 
Rights Act is to protect citizens from the misuse of power 
by individuals cloaked with the authority of state law. 
Owen, 445 U.S. at 650. As noted by the Court, in enacting 
the Civil Rights Act: 
 
       Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the 
       relationship between the States and the Nation with 
       respect to the protection of federally created rights; it 
       was concerned that state instrumentalities could not 
       protect those rights; it realized that state officers 
       might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of 
       those rights; and it believed that these failings 
       extended to the state courts . . . . The very purpose of 
       S 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the 
       States and the people, as the guardians of the people's 
       federal rights -- to protect the people from 
       unconstitutional action under color of state law . .. ." 
 
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). Applying a 
presumption of probable cause in a section 1983 action on 
the sole basis of a municipal conviction that has 
subsequently been overturned undermines one of the Civil 
Rights Act's raisons d'etre, i.e., to interpose the federal 
courts, as guardians of federal rights, between the 
authority of the states and the people. Accord Heck, 512 
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U.S. at 496 (Souter, J., concurring)(discussing generally the 
Restatement rule and noting that the Court disclaims the 
"untenable" position that a conviction "wipes out a person's 
S 1983 claim for damages for unconstitutional conviction or 
postconviction confinement."). 
 
B. 
 
In the absence of a presumption of probable cause 
arising from the municipal conviction, the issue of whether 
De Simone had probable cause to stop and arrest 
Montgomery rests entirely upon the credibility of the 
witnesses. According to Montgomery, she had only had one 
drink on the night in question and could not have been 
exceeding the speed limit. In addition, Montgomery alleges 
that De Simone lied at her trial and that his motive for 
arresting her was unrelated to either her speed or her 
alleged intoxication. Taking all of Montgomery's allegations 
as true and resolving all inferences in her favor as we must, 
we find that a reasonable jury could conclude that 
De Simone did not have probable cause to stop or to arrest 
Montgomery. Montgomery therefore has raised a genuine 
issue of material fact as to probable cause and summary 
judgment on her section 1983 malicious prosection claim 
was accordingly inappropriate. 
 
III. 
 
The parties agree that a two-year limitations period 
applies to Montgomery's section 1983 claims. 4 The parties 
disagree, however, as to when the two-year limitations 
period began to run on Montgomery's section 1983 false 
arrest and false imprisonment claims. The defendants 
contends that the limitations period began to run on these 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985), the Court held that for 
S 1983 actions, courts should apply the state statute of limitations 
applicable to personal injury torts. We have since held that New Jersey's 
two-year limitations period on personal injury actions, N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-2, 
applies to a civil rights claim under S 1983. Cito v. Bridgewater Township 
Police Dept., 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989). The parties are therefore 
correct in assuming that a two-year limitations period applies to 
Montgomery's S 1983 claims. 
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claims on the date of Montgomery's arrest. Montgomery, on 
the other hand, contends that the statute of limitations 
period did not begin to run on these claims until her 
criminal charges were resolved in her favor. 
 
It is axiomatic that under federal law, which governs the 
accrual of section 1983 claims, "the limitations period 
begins to run from the time when the plaintiff knows or has 
reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the 
section 1983 action." Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 
F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991). A claim for false arrest, 
unlike a claim for malicious prosecution, covers damages 
only for the time of detention until the issuance of process 
or arraignment, and not more. Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 
477, 484 (1994)(citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on Law of Torts S119, at 888 (5th ed. 1984)). In 
addition, Montgomery's section 1983 false imprisonment 
claim relates only to her arrest and the few hours she was 
detained immediately following her arrest. See  App. 74-76 
(Complaint). Montgomery therefore reasonably knew of the 
injuries that form the basis of these section 1983 claims on 
the night of her arrest. Accordingly, under Gentry, the two- 
year limitation period for Montgomery's section 1983 false 
arrest and false imprisonment claims began to run on 
September 30, 1992, the night of Montgomery's arrest and 
detention. Because Montgomery filed her action on 
February 1, 1995, more than two years after the date of her 
arrest, the district court was correct in dismissing 
Montgomery's section 1983 false arrest and false 
imprisonment claims as time barred.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Montgomery argues that under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 
(1994), these claims only accrued after her criminal charges were 
resolved in her favor. In Heck, the Court held that a section 1983 claim 
for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence 
does not accrue until that conviction or sentence has been invalidated. 
Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90. The Court also noted, however, that if a 
successful claim would not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding 
criminal judgment, it should be allowed to proceed. Id. at 487. Because 
a conviction and sentence may be upheld even in the absence of 
probable cause for the initial stop and arrest, wefind that Montgomery's 
claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are not the type of claims 
contemplated by the Court in Heck which necessarily implicate the 
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IV. 
 
Under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, municipal defendants cannot be 
held liable under a theory of respondeat superior; municipal 
liability only arises when a constitutional deprivation 
results from an official custom or policy. Monell v. 
Department of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 
658, 691-94 (1978). Furthermore, a municipality's failure to 
train police officers only gives rise to a constitutional 
violation when that failure amounts to deliberate 
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police 
come into contact. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 
378, 388 (1989). We have held that a failure to train, 
discipline or control can only form the basis for section 
1983 municipal liability if the plaintiff can show both 
contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or 
knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents and 
circumstances under which the supervisor's actions or 
inaction could be found to have communicated a message 
of approval to the offending subordinate. See Boneberger v. 
Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
Montgomery's claims against the municipal defendants 
rest on allegations that these defendants are directly 
responsible for De Simone's action and that they failed to 
adequately train, discipline or control De Simone which give 
him the opportunity to harass and unlawfully detain 
Montgomery. To the extent that these claims are based 
upon a respondeat superior theory, they are barred under 
Monell. In addition, Montgomery's failure to train, discipline 
or control claim seems to be based on the contention that 
De Simone was never trained not to sexually harass the 
female public and was not disciplined as a result of the 
incident involving Montgomery. Montgomery, however, 
points to no inadequacy in De Simone's police training 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
validity of a conviction or sentence. See Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 
746 (5th Cir. 1995)(stating that "[i]t is well established that a claim of 
unlawful arrest, standing alone, does not necessarily implicate the 
validity of a criminal prosecution following the arrest."). Accordingly, 
we 
read Heck to be consistent with our determination that Montgomery's 
false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrued on the night of her 
arrest. 
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program. In addition, she has failed to allege any action or 
inaction by the municipal defendants that could be 
interpreted as encouraging De Simone's offensive actions. 
Because Montgomery's allegations do not implicate the type 
of deliberate indifference required for section 1983 
municipal liability, the district court was correct in granting 
summary judgment in favor of the municipal defendants on 
Montgomery's section 1983 claims. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's order dismissing Montgomery's section 1983 false 
arrest, false imprisonment, and municipal liability claims. 
We will reverse that portion of the district court's order 
dismissing Montgomery's section 1983 malicious 
prosecution claim against Officer De Simone because 
Montgomery has raised a genuine issue of material fact as 
to probable cause and remand for further proceedings. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
 
I join in parts I, III, and IV of the majority opinion which 
holds that Montgomery's false arrest and false 
imprisonment claims are time-barred and which affirms 
summary judgment in favor of the municipal defendants on 
the S 1983 claims. I do not agree, however, with the 
majority's conclusion in Part II that, in an action for 
malicious prosecution under S 1983, an overturned 
conviction does not presumptively establish probable cause. 
 
The majority holds that such a rule contravenes the 
policies underlying the Civil Rights Act. I maintain, to the 
contrary, that the Restatement of Torts/Common Law rule 
should apply. Under this rule, unless a conviction is 
contrary to established law or has been obtained by fraud, 
perjury or other corrupt means, such a conviction, even if 
it is ultimately overturned, has still presumptively 
established probable cause to pursue the original 
prosecution. I believe that the majority's exception for 
actions under S 1983 should not be extended beyond the 
already recognized exceptions. Indeed, with the availability 
of these Restatement/Common Law exceptions, the 
purpose of S 1983 is not defeated. 
 
As the majority states, in order to prevail on a claim of 
malicious prosecution under S 1983, a plaintiff must 
establish, among other things, the absence of probable 
cause for the original proceeding brought against the 
plaintiff. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 349 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(citing Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1988). In 
reversing the district court, the majority concludes that the 
common law rule, establishing a presumption of probable 
cause from a conviction later reversed, should not apply to 
S 1983 actions. 
 
The majority acknowledges that the case law reflects 
exceptions to the common law rule so that a conviction 
subsequently overturned establishes only a rebuttable 
presumption of probable cause. See Lind v. Schmid, 337 
A.2d 365 (N.J. 1975). The common law rule is based on the 
concept that, if a fact finder determines guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, there must have been probable cause for 
doing so unless it is later determined that the conviction 
was fraudulently or corruptly obtained. Id. 
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The majority does not, however, adopt the 
Restatement/Common Law rebuttable presumption. 
Instead, they conclude that, when a malicious prosecution 
action is brought under S 1983, an overturned municipal 
court conviction does not presumptively establish probable 
cause. Majority at 8-9. Because I conclude that the 
purposes of S 1983 are not offended by application of a 
rebuttable presumption and because I find that the district 
court committed no legal error in applying the common law 
rule in its summary judgment determination, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
In this case, Montgomery's municipal court conviction 
was overturned upon a trial de novo by the state superior 
court. After deeming radar gun evidence inadmissible, the 
superior court judge concluded that Montgomery could not 
be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If, however, a 
failure to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could negate 
a finding of probable cause to initiate the proceeding, every 
successful appeal would prompt a claim of malicious 
prosecution. 
 
In its analysis, the district court examined the effect of 
the overturned municipal conviction on the malicious 
prosecution claim. The court relied on the common law rule 
to conclude that if a magistrate's determination of guilt was 
reasonably reached (even if later overturned), the 
presumption of probable cause should not be disturbed 
unless rebutted with evidence that the conviction was 
obtained fraudulently. See, e.g., Lind at 370. The district 
court then found that the New Jersey magistrate had relied 
both on radar evidence and on Officer De Simone's 
testimony of a visual estimate of a speeding violation and 
had reasonably concluded that there was probable cause to 
stop Montgomery and to find her guilty of speeding. 
Although the superior court ultimately deemed the radar 
evidence to be inadmissible because a proper foundation 
had not been laid, the district court reasoned, correctly I 
believe, that the inadmissibility of the radar evidence 
should have no effect on whether it was reasonable to 
prosecute Montgomery in the first place. 
 
The District Court's dismissal of the malicious 
prosecution claim hinged on Montgomery's failure to 
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establish such an absence of probable cause. I believe that 
the reversal of the municipal court conviction, based on 
insufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, should not be sufficient to dislodge afinding of 
probable cause to initiate the proceeding. A reversal for 
insufficient evidence is not a finding that the conviction was 
brought about fraudulently or corruptly. 
 
The majority concludes to the contrary that the 
rebuttable presumption should not apply here because we 
are dealing with a claim of malicious prosecution under 
S 1983. The majority reasons that, since the Civil Rights Act 
was created to interpose the federal courts between the 
misuse of state authority and individuals, we would violate 
the goals of the Civil Rights Act if we were to allow a 
reversed conviction to create a presumption of probable 
cause in a S 1983 malicious prosecution claim. 
 
The Second Circuit has also adopted the common law 
exceptions in a S 1983 action for false arrest. In Cameron v. 
Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 388 (2d Cir. 1988), that court held 
that the common law rule provides a sufficient balance 
between individual liberty interests and societal interest in 
law enforcement because the exclusionary rule sufficiently 
deters police from arresting without probable cause. The 
majority points out that this Court has questioned whether 
the rule in Cameron reflects the "proper accommodation" 
between individual and societal interests. Rose v. Bartle, 
871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989). Cameron and Rose, however, 
both involved claims for false arrest. I conclude that the 
difference between a false arrest claim, in which a person 
may have been illegally arrested even though guilty of the 
prosecuted offense, is very different from a malicious 
prosecution claim where the propriety of the prosecution 
itself depends on it being initiated with probable cause. For 
this reason, I do not find that our concern in Rose carries 
over to the present situation. 
 
The majority also quotes with approval from Justice 
Souter's concurrence in Heck v. Murphy where he called 
"untenable" the notion that a municipal conviction could 
"wipe out" a S 1983 claim. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 
477, 496 (1994). But, the common law rule does not wipe 
out a person's S 1983 claim. To the contrary, it raises a 
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rebuttable presumption of probable cause. This 
presumption may be rebutted with a showing that the 
conviction was brought about through fraud or coercion, 
precisely the type of conduct which S 1983 was created to 
guard against. Applying the common law rule of a 
rebuttable presumption of probable cause in the case before 
us does not interfere with the goals of the Civil Rights Act. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
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